Much has been said about the exessive power wielded by the pharmaceutical industry through the patent regime, resulting in exorbitant prices, if not outright insane, of new medicines and technologies. So insane, in fact, that even governments in developed countries find it difficult to keep their health service up to date.
In the newest scandal, pharma giant Novartis is blamed for concealing information about a new therapy for children with spinal muscular atrophy. Few have noticed that Dr. Scott Gottlieb, who had ended his term as the 23rd Commissioner of the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) several months ago, and recently tweeted about the crisis, currently serves as a director in another pharma giant, Pfizer.
Obviously, Pfizer wants such a man on board, both for the invaluable information he can provide about the way the FDA operates, and as a resonating message for all those currently serving as regulators. Even the most effective and scrupulous gatekeeper might be more lenient, when in the back of his mind lurks the thought that the people, he oversees today could be his colleagues tomorrow. How is it possible that the mobility between regulator and regulated is made so easily?
The phenomenon is familiar to us in Israel as well: The Supervisor of Banks becomes the CEO of one of the largest banks; the Head of the Treasury’s Budget Division becomes a bank chairperson; and senior central bank and treasury officials represent the tycoons they have only recently overseen.
“Cooling off” periods are supposed to maintain the separation of powers, but they are too short and insignificant to have any discernible effect. People who leave such senior positions can afford a year off, knowing that around the corner awaits them a salary with more digits than we can even imagine. SO how can we be sure that during their term in office, when they are supposed to protect us against the pharma industry, its manipulations and outrageous prices, they are in fact doing their job?
The eroding public trust in the state health system is due, in no small measure, to the conflation of interests between the system and its own gatekeepers. Therefore, would it not be appropriate to require those interested in serving in senior regulatory positions to undertake not to work for regulated entities for a period of several years?
Knowing that the regulated bodies will have contact, if at all, with the regulators, only in the distant future, will contribute to their ability to faithfully do their job.
